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The main purpose of the note is two-fold (i) Correcting an error in the two-part tariff licensing 
contract, and (ii) Altering one of the main results following the two-part tariff analysis in 
Mukherjee, A. and Mukherjee S., (2013), Economics Letters. This also strengthens the primary 
conclusion of Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013). 
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Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2013) (henceforth MM (2013) showed that in a Cournot 
framework, under a fixed-fee licensing contract if the licensor and the licensee bargain over the 
licensing fee, licensing decreases (increases) innovation incentives vis-a-vis no licensing for low 
(high) cost innovation. This is an interesting result to see the impact of licensing on innovation 
incentive of competing firms. MM (2013) also claims that a two-part tariff licensing always 
increases innovation incentive regardless of innovation cost. We believe this second result is not 
correct and revise the result here.  
More specifically, the main purpose of this note is two-fold. (i) Correcting an error in the two-
part tariff analysis in MM (2013). In particular, we show that the optimal licensing contract derived 
in the section 3.2 (page 501) is not correct and we provide the correct solution. (ii) This also leads 
to a correction of Proposition 4, one of the main results of their paper regarding innovation 
incentive of the firm(s). This correction and revision further strengthens the main research findings 
of MM (2013). It also makes the main result more robust and consistent in the sense that in this 
framework, innovation incentives of firm(s) qualitatively remains unchanged under different 
licensing contracts. 
We refer to MM (2013) for the basic model of the analysis and keep all the notations same 
here to be consistent. We only focus on those parts of the paper of MM (2013) which need to be 
addressed. The rest of the analysis and findings in MM (2013) remain unchanged.   
 
Licensing of Innovation 
Two-Part Tariff Analysis (Discussed in section 3.2 in MM 2013) 
As in MM (2013), without loss of generality, let us assume firm 1 to be the innovating firm with 
bargaining power 𝛼𝛼 (0 ≤ 𝛼𝛼 ≤ 1) and firm 2 to be the non-innovating firm with bargaining power 
(1 − 𝛼𝛼). Firm 1 offers a two-part tariff licensing contract (𝐹𝐹, 𝑟𝑟) to firm 2, where 𝐹𝐹 is the fixed 
fee and 𝑟𝑟 is the per unit royalty.  
The problem for firm 1 can be expressed as  











































(r2 − c2 + ac − ar) − F 
Then we have 
𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹


















= 0 then 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟
> 0. Therefore 𝑟𝑟 should be as large as possible: 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑐𝑐. However, 
when 𝑟𝑟 = 𝑐𝑐, we get 𝐴𝐴 = c (a−2c)
3
+ F and 𝐵𝐵 = −F.  
Now, 𝐹𝐹 must be 0 (restricting attention to 𝐹𝐹 ≥ 0), otherwise firm 2 (licensee) would be worse-
off after licensing. But then [𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 − (1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴] = −(1 − 𝛼𝛼)c (a−2c)
3
< 0 , and we have a 
contradiction to  𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹
= 0.  






= 0 then 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝐹𝐹
< 0. Therefore 𝐹𝐹 should be as small as possible: 𝐹𝐹 = 0.  
Given 𝐹𝐹 = 0, we have 5𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 − 4(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴 = 4
9
[5r2 − 5ar + (1 − 6α)c2 + (2 + 3α)ac]. 
Let 5𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵 − 4(1 − 𝛼𝛼)𝐴𝐴 = 0 (⇔ 𝜕𝜕𝐴𝐴
𝛼𝛼𝐵𝐵1−𝛼𝛼
𝜕𝜕𝑟𝑟






Therefore, the general Nash-bargained two-part tariff solution is  







Hence, we also show that the optimal licensing contract in this environment is pure royalty. From 
the expression of 𝑟𝑟∗, it is also clear that the optimal royalty increases with bargaining power 𝛼𝛼, 
an intuitive result. 
 
Given above, the expressions (the ‘Innovation’ and the ‘No innovation’ cell) in Table 3 (page 501) 
in MM (2013) needs to be revised as well since the final pay-offs of both firms will now look 
different (see below).  
 Revised Table 3: The Payoffs of Firm 1 and Firm 2  









More importantly, this correction changes the result in Proposition 4 of MM (2013). The correct 
statement of Proposition 4 should be as follows. 
 
Proposition 4 (Revised) 
(a) If 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝑋𝑋∗,𝑋𝑋), both firms innovate under no-licensing but only one firm innovates with two-
part tariff licensing. Therefore, two-part tariff licensing reduces innovation vis-à-vis no-licensing 
for a range of low-cost innovation. 
(b) If 𝑘𝑘 ∈ (𝑌𝑌, 𝑌𝑌∗), neither firm innovates with no-licensing whereas exactly one firm innovates 
with two-part tariff licensing. Therefore, two-part tariff licensing increases innovation vis-a-vis 
no- licensing for a range of high-cost innovation. 
Proof: See Appendix.   
 
 Innovation No Innovation 
Innovation 𝜋𝜋1(0, 0) − 𝑘𝑘,    
𝜋𝜋2(0, 0) − 𝑘𝑘 





𝜋𝜋2(𝑟𝑟∗, 0) + 𝑟𝑟∗𝑞𝑞1∗(𝑟𝑟∗, 0) − 𝑘𝑘 




Thus the effect of bargained two-part tariff licensing on innovation incentive is qualitatively 
similar to the bargained fixed fee licensing given in Proposition 3 in MM (2013).1 Note that if 
𝛼𝛼 = 1, 𝑟𝑟∗ = 𝑐𝑐 and therefore we get 𝑋𝑋 = 𝑋𝑋∗. Only in this situation, under two-part tariff licensing, 
technology transfer increases innovation unambiguously. Thus Proposition 4 of MM (2013) holds 
only for 𝛼𝛼 = 1 and not for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1).  
The innovation incentives under two-part tariff licensing compared to no licensing is shown in the 
figure below:  
 
Figure 1: Innovation Incentive under two-part tariff licensing compared with no licensing  
(Cost of innovation increases towards the right) 
 
In the Appendix (page 502) of MM (2013), where the welfare analysis is done under two-part tariff 
licensing, some revision is in order. In particular, the statement “consumer surplus remains the 
same” needs to be corrected. Under the correct two-part tariff analysis there would be an increase 
in consumer surplus as the price of the good will fall as long as 𝛼𝛼 < 1 and therefore, overall 








1 However, it is now clear that bargained fee fixed fee licensing in MM (2013) is suboptimal in a complete information 
model for the innovator which was not identified in MM (2013). Nevertheless, it is well understood that if 
implementing a royalty licensing is difficult due to observational issue of the licensee’s output, then fixed fee licensing 





Proof of Proposition 4: 
We need to check the innovation incentive under the two-part tariff contract. To fix ideas consider 
the incentive for firm 1 (similar argument will hold for firm 2 as well). 
From Table-3, we get that both firms will invest in R&D if 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝜋𝜋1(0, 0) − 𝜋𝜋1(𝑟𝑟∗, 0) ≡ 𝑋𝑋∗. Now 
since 𝑟𝑟∗ < 𝑐𝑐  for 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1) , we get 𝜋𝜋1(𝑟𝑟∗, 0) > 𝜋𝜋1(𝑐𝑐, 0) . Therefore 𝜋𝜋1(0, 0) − 𝜋𝜋1(𝑟𝑟∗, 0) =
𝑋𝑋∗ < 𝜋𝜋1(0, 0) − 𝜋𝜋1(𝑐𝑐, 0) ≡ 𝑋𝑋. Thus the range for which both firms innovate shrinks compared to 
the no licensing case. 
Again the range of R&D cost for which only one firm innovates is  
𝑋𝑋∗ = 𝜋𝜋1(0, 0) − 𝜋𝜋1(𝑟𝑟∗, 0) < 𝑘𝑘 ≤ 𝜋𝜋1(0, 𝑟𝑟∗) − 𝜋𝜋1(𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐) + 𝑟𝑟∗𝑞𝑞2∗(0, 𝑟𝑟∗) ≡ 𝑌𝑌∗ 
Since 𝑟𝑟∗ comes from a bargained solution and 𝛼𝛼 ∈ (0,1), it must be the case that 𝜋𝜋1(0, 𝑟𝑟∗) +
𝑟𝑟∗𝑞𝑞2∗(0, 𝑟𝑟∗) > 𝜋𝜋1(0, 𝑐𝑐), i.e., post bargaining two-part tariff contract the innovator must be better-
off compared to no licensing. Therefore,𝑌𝑌∗ = 𝜋𝜋1(0, 𝑟𝑟∗) + 𝑟𝑟∗𝑞𝑞2∗(0, 𝑟𝑟∗) − 𝜋𝜋1(𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐) > 𝜋𝜋1(0, 𝑐𝑐) −
𝜋𝜋1(𝑐𝑐, 𝑐𝑐) ≡ 𝑌𝑌. 
Note that given the demand and cost specifications, we have X < Y. This completes the proof. 
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